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NOTE
USING COMPUTER FORENSICS TO ENHANCE THE
DISCOVERY OF ELECTRONICALLY
STORED INFORMATION
FRANZ J. VANCURA*
“The duty to preserve relevant evidence is fundamental to federal
litigation.”1
I. INTRODUCTION2
Failing to preserve and produce electronically stored information is
costly for attorneys and clients alike: incompetent or unethical attorneys
risk disciplinary action and violate the rules of professional conduct, dis-
covery disputes anger overburdened judges, and the offending parties often
pay the price—literally and figuratively.3 The expansive and seemingly re-
lentless growth of electronic discovery continues to radically alter the civil
litigation landscape in terms of scope, mechanisms, cost, and complexity.4
Unfortunately, this landscape remains ridden with electronic discovery re-
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1. Innis Arden Golf Club v. Pitney Bowes, Inc., 257 F.R.D. 334, 339 (D. Conn. 2009).
2. At the outset of this note, it is necessary to state what it does and does not attempt to
accomplish. This note is solely limited to the discovery phase of pre-trial litigation. It does not
deal with the eventual admissibility of any evidence gained through forensic imaging at trial. See
Lorraine v. Markel Am. Ins. Co., 241 F.R.D. 534 (D. Md. 2007), which provides a thorough
discussion of the issue of the admissibility of electronically stored information (ESI) and an
exhaustive analysis of how ESI may be admitted into evidence. See also The Sedona Conference
Working Group on Electronic Document Retention & Production, The Sedona Conference
Commentary on ESI Evidence & Admissibility, 9 SEDONA CONF. J. 217 (2008) [hereinafter ESI &
Admissibility].
3. See, e.g., Genworth Fin. Wealth Mgmt., Inc. v. McMullan, 267 F.R.D. 443, 448 (D.
Conn. 2010) (“Plaintiff’s motion for sanctions is warranted by the fact that it had to seek Court
orders to obtain that to which it has been entitled but which the Defendants unreasonably and
dubiously refused and possibly intentionally made unavailable. . . . The Defendants have wasted
the Plaintiff’s and the Court’s resources in necessitating the judicial resolution of this discovery
dispute.”).
4. PSEG Power N.Y., Inc. v. Alberici Constructors, Inc., No. 1:05-CV-657, 2007 WL
2687670, at *1 (N.D.N.Y. Sept. 7, 2007).
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lated casualties or failures, which are ultimately preventable.5 Knowing and
abiding by the rules of civil procedure are essential to conducting electronic
discovery. At a minimum, this entails identifying when the duty to preserve
electronically stored information arises, as well as the types of information
that a litigant or potential litigant must maintain once the duty to preserve
electronically stored information arises. Traditional discovery methods and
knowledge of the federal rules of civil procedure are no longer sufficient for
conducting competent electronic discovery.6 Competent representation in
cases involving electronic discovery now requires a familiarity with a wide
variety of technologies.7 One such technology of increasing importance is
forensic imaging.8
Computer forensics is “the art and science of applying computer sci-
ence to aid the legal process.”9 Broadly speaking, computer forensics in-
volves the location, examination, identification, collection, preservation,
and analysis of computer systems and electronically stored information
(ESI).10 A forensic image, then, is an exact duplicate of the entire hard
drive, and includes all the scattered clusters of the active and deleted files
and the slack and free space.11
The courts vary significantly in their approaches to forensic imaging in
civil litigation.12 Judges are more likely to allow forensic imaging in cases
where a party seeking a Rule 26(c) protective order has failed to adequately
fulfill its discovery obligations13 or when relevant evidence is being de-
stroyed through the normal operation of a computer.14 Conversely, requests
to access an opposing party’s computer(s) without proof of wrongdoing or
5. Id.
6. See Alan J. Ross & Gregory J. Krabacher, ELECTRONIC DISCOVERY IN 2007: DISCOVER-
ING HOW LITTLE WE KNOW 1 (2007) (“The prevalent use of technology in business . . . has
unsettled the formerly well-established procedures by which parties to federal litigation prepared
their case in the pre-computer era.”).
7. See Mark L. Tuft, Ethical Challenges in Emerging Technology, 24 No. 4 GPSOLO 64, 64
(June 2007) (“A lawyer’s duties of competence and diligence could take on a new meaning as the
practice of law becomes increasingly paperless. Competent representation requires more than le-
gal knowledge. It also requires the skill, thoroughness, and preparation reasonably necessary for
the representation.”).
8. Forensic imaging is also known as mirror imaging or forensic copying. It is different
from forensic examination.
9. ESI & Admissibility, supra note 2, at 228.
10. Id.
11. United States v. Triumph Capital Grp., Inc., 211 F.R.D. 31, 48 (D. Conn. 2002).
12. See, e.g., John B. v. M.D. Goetz, Jr., 531 F.3d 448, 459 (6th Cir. 2008) (“Because liti-
gants are generally responsible for preserving relevant information on their own, such procedures,
if at all appropriate, should be employed in a very limited set of circumstances.”). The Goetz
court, however, went on to state in dicta that forensic imaging is not uncommon in civil discovery
and that parties may choose on their own to preserve information through forensic imaging. Id.
13. Playboy Enters., Inc. v. Welles, 60 F. Supp. 2d 1050, 1054–55 (S.D. Cal. 1999) (allowing
plaintiffs to forensically image defendant’s hard drive where defendant had a habit of regularly
deleting relevant files from her computer).
14. See Antioch Co. v. Scrapbook Borders, Inc., 210 F.R.D. 645, 652 (D. Minn. 2002) (al-
lowing plaintiffs to create a mirror image of defendant’s computer after finding that “Defendants
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other exceptional circumstances are often unsuccessful.15 Courts, commen-
tators, and litigating attorneys alike cite concerns about attorney-client priv-
ilege,16 confidentiality,17 relevance,18 and cost19 when arguing against
granting an opposing party direct access to personal or work computers in
order to obtain a mirror image. Though not lacking a rational basis, these
fears are all readily dismissible if counsel cooperate and employ effective
procedural methods to protect their client’s private, irrelevant, or protected
information.
Yet, in the oft-quoted words of a federal judge, “[t]oo often, discovery
is not just about uncovering the truth, but also about how much of the truth
the parties can afford to disinter.”20 Thus, the thesis of this note is that
foreseeable litigants should, and will likely be required to, forensically im-
age relevant digital storage devices at the onset of litigation to remedy the
negligent, grossly negligent, and intentional discovery abuses that waste the
court’s time, wantonly increase the cost of litigation, and prevent the merit-
based adjudication of a lawsuit. This note will further argue that courts
should liberally grant a party’s request to forensically image and examine
an opponent’s digital storage devices when there is strong evidence of spo-
liation or other discovery abuses.
To this end, Part II of this note will discuss when the duty to preserve
ESI arises as well as the extent of that duty. Part III will address the pri-
vacy, attorney-client privilege, relevance, and cost related concerns that
often arise when forensic imaging is a potential component of civil litiga-
tion. In Part IV, this note will discuss how voluntary or court-ordered imag-
ing at the onset of litigation can help to solve the problems of Parts II and
may have relevant information, on their computer equipment, which is being lost through normal
use of the computer . . . .”).
15. See, e.g., Balfour Beatty Rail, Inc. v. Vaccarello, No. 3:06-cv-551-J-20MCR, 2007 WL
169628, at *3 (M.D. Fla. Jan. 18, 2007) (“Plaintiff’s requests simply seek computer hard drives.
Plaintiff does not provide any information regarding what it seeks to discover from the hard drives
nor does it make any contention that Defendants have failed to provide requested information
contained on these hard drives.”).
16. See Cenveo Corp. v. Slater, No. 06-CV-2632, 2007 WL 442387, at *1 (E.D. Pa. Jan. 31,
2007) (defendants opposed imaging of their hard drives on the grounds that it might result in the
disclosure of privileged information).
17. See Goetz, 531 F.3d at 460 (“The district court’s compelled forensic imaging orders here
fail to account properly for the significant privacy and confidentiality concerns present in this
case.”).
18. Hedenburg v. Aramark Am. Food Servs., No. C06-5257, 2007 WL 162716, at *2 (W.D.
Wash. Jan. 17, 2007) (denying defendant’s request to image plaintiff’s hard drive and holding that
“the central claims in the case are wholly unrelated to the contents of plaintiff’s computer”).
19. Citizens for Responsibility & Ethics in Wash. v. Exec. Office, No. 07-1707, 07-1577,
2008 WL 2932173, at *3 (D.D.C. July 29, 2008) (denying plaintiff’s request to image defendant’s
hard drive failed after the court subjected plaintiff’s request to a cost/benefit analysis and deter-
mined that a large portion of data was already irretrievably lost).
20. PSEG Power N.Y., Inc. v. Alberici Constructors, Inc., No. 1:05-CV-657, 2007 WL
2687670, at *9 (N.D.N.Y. Sept. 7, 2007) (quoting Rowe Entm’t, Inc. v. William Morris Agency,
Inc., 205 F.R.D. 421, 423 (S.D.N.Y. 2002)).
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III. Finally, Part V will advocate for liberal judicially ordered direct access
when a producing party has failed to image its relevant digital storage de-
vices or is otherwise negligent in its duties to produce relevant ESI.
II. DUTY TO PRESERVE
The destruction, intentional or otherwise, of non-privileged ESI rele-
vant to anticipated or ongoing litigation is unethical and subverts the long-
standing common law principal that “[m]utual knowledge of all the relevant
facts gathered by both parties is essential to proper litigation.”21 Failing to
preserve relevant evidence also violates the Model Rules of Professional
Conduct’s prohibition against obstructing a party’s access to evidence.22
Forensic imaging all potentially relevant digital storage devices in anticipa-
tion of litigation will help ensure full compliance with the Rules of Civil
Procedure and Professional Conduct. This section explains when a party’s
duty to preserve relevant, non-privileged evidence arises. It also explains
what kinds of evidence a party must preserve, and argues that forensic
imaging can be an efficient and cost-effective way to competently manage
the earliest stages of a lawsuit involving the discovery of electronically
stored information.
A. When the Duty to Preserve Arises
Although the duty to preserve evidence is well recognized at common
law,23 many electronic discovery related casualties stem from counsel’s
failure to adequately administer a timely litigation hold.24 Identifying the
boundaries of the duty to preserve involves two related inquiries. First, a
litigant must determine when the duty to preserve arises.25 The duty to pre-
serve evidence “arises when the party has notice that the evidence is rele-
vant to litigation or when a party should have known that the evidence may
be relevant to future litigation.”26 This means that the obligation to preserve
21. Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 507 (1947).
22. The Sedona Conference, The Case for Cooperation, 10 SEDONA CONF. J. 339, 353
(2009). See also MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 3.4(a), (d) (2006).
23. See FED. R. CIV. P. 37(f) advisory committee’s note (“A preservation obligation may
arise from many sources, including common law, statutes, regulations, or a court order in the
case.”).
24. See, e.g., Major Tours, Inc. v. Colorel, No. 05-3091, 2009 WL 2413631, at *4–5 (D.N.J.
Aug. 4, 2009) (defendants failed to issue a litigation hold for over a year after the duty to preserve
definitively arose and were required to produce documents otherwise undiscoverable under the
work product doctrine as a result); Zubulake v. UBS Warburg LLC, 229 F.R.D. 422, 424
(S.D.N.Y. 2004) (Zubulake V) (explaining the importance of a client’s obligation to heed coun-
sel’s preservation instructions where, notwithstanding a timely litigation hold, employees deleted
relevant e-mails).
25. Zubulake v. UBS Warburg LLC, 220 F.R.D. 212, 216 (S.D.N.Y. 2003) (Zubulake IV).
26. Fujitsu Ltd. v. Fed. Express Corp., 247 F.3d 423, 436 (2d Cir. 2001); see also Zubulake,
220 F.R.D. at 218 (“Once a party reasonably anticipates litigation, it must suspend its routine
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documents necessarily begins at the onset of a lawsuit, but may arise before
the initiation of any litigation.
The concept of “future litigation” in the Federal Courts is largely unde-
fined.27 Courts apply a case-by-case approach to determine whether a party
has satisfactorily fulfilled its preservation duties.28 Therefore, it is impossi-
ble to provide a definitive list of factors that will trigger the duty to pre-
serve, but litigants are not without some guidance from the courts. The
mere contemplation that an employee may sue sometime in the future does
not generally trigger a firm-wide duty to preserve.29 Courts will look at the
level of awareness among employees that future litigation may arise to de-
termine if a party should have reasonably anticipated litigation.30 Con-
versely, a potential plaintiff is under a duty to preserve evidence where she
anticipates or considers filing a lawsuit.31 In tax litigation with the federal
government, the circuit courts are split as to whether an audit triggers the
duty to preserve in anticipation of litigation.32
As a general guideline, courts use the following factors to resolve a
conflict about whether a duty to preserve exists: (1) the extent to which the
producing party’s conduct was intended to affect the opposing party, (2) the
foreseeability of harm to the opposing party, (3) the degree of certainty that
the opposing party suffered injury, (4) the closeness of the connection be-
tween opposing party’s conduct and the requesting party’s injury, (5) the
moral blame attached to the opposing party’s conduct, and (6) the court’s
desire to prevent the conduct in the future.33 When applying these criteria,
courts seem especially focused on the disposition of the litigant (whether it
is the plaintiff or the defendant) and the likelihood of litigation to determine
whether a party was under an obligation to preserve.
document retention/destruction policy and put in place a ‘litigation hold’ to ensure the preserva-
tion of relevant documents.”).
27. Ronald C. Goss, Hot Issues in Electronic Discovery: Information Retention Programs
and Preservation, 42 TORT TRIAL & INS. PRAC. L.J. 797, 813 (2007).
28. United States v. Grammatikos, 633 F.2d 1013, 1019–20 (2d Cir. 1980). See also Consol.
Edison Co. of N.Y., Inc. v. United States, 90 Fed. Cl. 228, 259 (2009) (“[T]he facts and circum-
stances of the individual case must be assessed to decide when litigation should be deemed by a
court to be anticipated . . . .”); Mohrmeyer v. Wal-Mart Stores East, L.P., No. 09-69-WOB, 2009
WL 4166996, at *3 n.1 (E.D. Ky. Nov. 20, 2009) (holding that Wal-Mart did not violate discovery
rules by destroying a restroom cleaning log as part of the company’s standard document retention
policy where plaintiff waited over a year after a slip and fall accident to file a lawsuit. In many
cases, notice and/or knowledge of the realistic threat of litigation will evolve more slowly, making
the precise trigger date more difficult to determine).
29. Zubulake, 220 F.R.D. at 216.
30. Id.
31. Aetna Life and Cas. Co. v. Imet Mason Contractors, 707 A.2d 180, 184 (N.J. Super.
1998).
32. Deseret Mgmt. Corp. v. United States, 76 Fed. Cl. 88, 93 (2007) (noting conflicting
holdings in the Second, Fourth, Fifth, and Sixth Circuits).
33. Velasco v. Commercial Bldg. Maint. Co., 169 Cal. App. 3d 874, 877–78 (1985) (citing
J’Aire Corp. v. Gregory, 598 P.2d 60 (1979)).
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Attorneys should begin formulating a litigation hold plan as soon as
potential litigation becomes more likely than not. With a litigation hold plan
in place, attorneys can monitor events to determine if any further action is
necessary. As the probability of litigation turns from a mere possibility to
likely, attorneys should begin to implement a litigation hold in order to
avoid sanctions and ensure that all relevant evidence is available for
production.
B. What Parties Must Preserve
We have already seen that a litigant or potential litigant must first de-
termine when the duty to preserve arises. The second relevant inquiry is
what must be preserved.34 Under the Federal Rules, opposing counsel is
entitled to obtain discovery regarding “any non-privileged matter that is rel-
evant to any party’s claim or defense.”35 Parties must retain all relevant
documents in existence at the time the duty to preserve arises in order to
adequately comply with Rule 26(b)(1).36 The duties to preserve and pro-
duce relevant documents are ongoing throughout discovery and do not end
after the initial disclosure.37 Litigants have a continuing duty to supplant
disclosure of documents throughout the discovery phase of a trial.38
Because of the vast amount of potentially discoverable ESI, civil dis-
covery and its corresponding duty to preserve and produce information has
become increasingly complex and expensive.39 A typical company with
20,000 employees can expect to store a total of approximately 4.5 billion e-
mails in little more than a decade’s time.40 This means that a company with
even a fraction of 20,000 employees is capable of producing a staggering
amount of ESI. Given the massive amount of potentially discoverable infor-
mation, the courts cannot and do not expect that parties will attain perfec-
tion in their preservation efforts.41 The standards for sufficient discovery
have been set by years of judicial decisions analyzing misconduct and de-
termining what a party must do to determine and meet its obligation to
participate meaningfully in the discovery phase of a proceeding.42
34. Zubulake, 220 F.R.D. at 216.
35. FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(1).
36. Zubulake, 220 F.R.D. at 218.
37. Zubulake v. UBS Warburg LLC, 229 F.R.D. 422, 433 (S.D.N.Y. 2004) (Zubulake V)
(“[T]he notion of a ‘duty to preserve’ connotes an ongoing obligation.”).
38. Id. at 433; FED. R. CIV. P. 26(e).
39. Pension Comm. of Univ. of Montreal Pension Plan v. Banc of Am. Sec., LLC, 685 F.
Supp. 2d 456, 461 (S.D.N.Y. 2010).
40. Goss, supra note 27, at 799.
41. Pension Comm., 685 F. Supp. 2d at 461.
42. Id. at 464.
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A party or potential party to litigation is free to choose how to preserve
documents,43 and is not required to preserve every document in its posses-
sion.44 However, it is well established that parties have a duty to preserve
what they know or reasonably should know is relevant to the action, is
reasonably likely to be requested in discovery, or is subject to a pending
discovery request.45 To ensure a good faith effort in preserving all relevant
documents, parties need to be proactive. This requires identifying privileged
documents as well as locating “key players”46 to determine the location of
non-privileged relevant documents for preservation.47 Once a party has ful-
filled these obligations, it must produce any and all relevant, unprivileged
documents that an opposing party properly asks for in a request for
production.48
C. Producing Documents
Rule 34 grants a litigating party the power to inspect, copy, test, or
sample documents and other tangible things, yet this power is not absolute.
All discovery is governed by the “proportionality principal” of Rule
26(b)(2)(C).49
The proportionality principal provides that a party need not preserve or
produce documents when the potential benefits are outweighed by the bur-
den or costs.50 Determining whether the production of documents is unduly
burdensome or expensive turns primarily on whether it is kept in an accessi-
ble or inaccessible format.51 Active data, online data, near-line data, and
off-line storage or archived data are all typically classified as accessible.52
43. Zubulake v. UBS Warburg LLC, 220 F.R.D. 212, 218 (S.D.N.Y. 2003) (Zubulake IV).
However, the 2006 Amendment to the Advisory Committee Note to Rule 34(a) makes clear that
FED. R. CIV. P. 34(a) requires the producing party to translate in a readily usable form any docu-
ments not stored in readily accessible forms.
44. Id. at 217; see also Malletier v. Dooney & Bourke, Inc., No. 04 Civ. 5316, 2006 WL
3851151, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 22, 2006) (holding company had no additional duty to install
equipment to preserve the conversations in a chat room).
45. Zubulake, 220 F.R.D. at 217 (“Must a corporation, upon recognizing the threat of litiga-
tion, preserve every shred of paper, every e-mail or electronic document, and every backup tape?
The answer is clearly, ‘no’.”).
46. Id. at 218 (the duty to preserve extends to those employees likely to have relevant infor-
mation—the “key players.”).
47. The Sedona Conference, The Sedona Conference Commentary on Achieving Quality in
the E-Discovery Process, 10 SEDONA CONF. J. 299, 320 (2009) [hereinafter Achieving Quality].
48. See FED. R. CIV. P. 34.
49. Additionally, Rule 26(b)(2)(B) limits the preservation and production of ESI. “A party
need not provide discovery of electronically stored information from sources that the party identi-
fies as not reasonably accessible because of undue burden or cost.” FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(2)(B).
50. Thomas Y. Allman, Conducting E-Discovery After the Amendments: The Second Wave,
10 SEDONA CONF. J. 215, 221 (2009).
51. Zubulake v. UBS Warburg LLC, 217 F.R.D. 309, 318 (S.D.N.Y. 2003) (Zubulake I). See
id. at 318–19, for a detailed description of the five categories of data, listed in order from most
accessible to least accessible.
52. Id. at 319–20.
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Conversely, data on backup tapes and erased, fragmented, or damaged data
are usually deemed inaccessible.53 The main difference between accessible
and inaccessible data is the format and speed of accessing the stored data.
Accessible data is simply stored in a more readily usable format.54
Federal Rule 37(e) also governs a party’s duty to preserve relevant
ESI. Rule 37(e) provides a safe harbor by limiting a court’s ability to sanc-
tion a party “for failing to provide electronically stored information lost as
the result of the routine, good-faith operation of an electronic information
system.”55 At least one court has recently applied Rule 37(e) in a traditional
discovery context and held that courts should apply Rule 37(e) narrowly.56
Litigants are still required, however, to preserve all relevant non-privileged
documents. Rule 37(e) only protects genuinely surprised—as opposed to
unwary—parties when they fail to preserve documents in the normal course
of business and they could not reasonably foresee the impending litigation.
In many cases involving electronic discovery, forensic imaging rele-
vant digital storage devices at the onset of a litigation is a safe, efficient,
and cost effective way to guarantee that a party adequately maintains all
discoverable documents. The forensically imaged drives, like their original
counterparts, are subject to the same discovery restrictions as traditional
discovery. Thus, wary clients and attorneys can be assured that they will not
be forced to produce trade secrets or irrelevant, confidential, or work-prod-
uct-protected material to an opponent absent any future discovery abuses.
III. BARRIERS TO FORENSIC IMAGING: COST, PRIVILEGE,
PRIVACY, AND RELEVANCE
The proportionality principal has many implications for a party wish-
ing to forensically image a digital storage device. Chief among these impli-
cations is cost. Other considerations include the inadvertent production of
work product, privileged communication, irrelevant documents, and inva-
sion of a party’s privacy.57 This section will address the issues precluding a
more liberal attitude toward forensic imaging and will offer proposals to
deal with these issues.
53. Id. at 320.
54. Id. See Citizens for Responsibility & Ethics in Wash. v. Exec. Office of the Pres., Nos.
07-1707 (HHK/JMF), 07-1577 (HHK/JMF), 2008 WL 2932173, at *3 (D.D.C. July 29, 2008), for
a good example of how a court will apply the proportionality principal to decide whether to allow
a party to access certain relevant ESI.
55. FED. R. CIV. P. 37(e).
56. Mohrneyer v. Wal-Mart Stores East, L.P., No. 09-69-WOB, 2009 WL 4166996, at *3
(E.D. Ky. Nov. 20, 2009) (“A narrow reading of Goetz is strongly suggested by Rule 37(e)”); see
also John B. v. M.D. Goetz, Jr., 531 F.3d 448 (6th Cir. 2008).
57. See supra notes 16–19 and accompanying text.
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A. Cost
Cost is the one factor in forensic imaging that is difficult to mitigate.58
Market forces determine the cost of imaging and searching a digital storage
device. In relatively small cases, the cost of imaging a single drive may be
cost prohibitive.59 In larger cases, the cost of hiring an expert to forensically
examine or reconstruct files on imaged storage devices can easily exceed
hundreds of thousands of dollars.60 Yet, there are steps that parties to a
lawsuit can take to make forensic imaging both feasible and a best practice
during the discovery phase of litigation.
First, the party requesting a forensic image can agree to pay the pro-
duction costs.61 This is a particularly attractive option in cases where an
opposing party cannot afford an expert to image or examine its digital stor-
age devices; ordinarily, the producing party is responsible for all production
costs.62 Courts have ordered cost shifting when the documents sought are
relevant but not readily accessible or the producing party has committed
egregious discovery abuses.63 Cost shifting takes the financial burden off of
the producing party and encourages the requesting party to act efficiently in
order to keep costs down. If the requesting party is unable or unwilling to
bear the entire cost of production, courts may order, or the parties can agree,
to share the costs of production.64
Aside from cost shifting, forensically imaging relevant storage devices
at the outset of discovery can help reduce costs stemming from subsequent
motion practice. Many discovery related casualties occur when parties fail
to produce or preserve relevant documents. Such incomplete discovery dis-
closures increase the overall cost of litigation because the offended party
58. But see Zubulake, 217 F.R.D. at 318 (“Electronic evidence is frequently cheaper and
easier to produce than paper evidence because it can be searched automatically, key words can be
run for privilege checks, and the production can be made in electronic form obviating the need for
mass photocopying.”).
59. Citizens, 2008 WL 2932173, at *3 (“[T]he ‘typical cost of forensic imaging a 100 GB
hard drive is between $400 and $1,000 and it takes approximately two to three hours to complete
the imaging.’”).
60. Id.
61. Playboy Enters., Inc. v. Welles, 60 F. Supp. 2d 1050, 1058 (S.D. Cal. 1999) (granting
plaintiff’s request to mirror image defendant’s hard drive but requiring plaintiff to pay all costs
associated with the production of the mirror image).
62. See Oppenheimer Fund, Inc. v. Sanders, 437 U.S. 340, 358 (1978) (noting that under the
discovery rules, “the presumption is that the responding party must bear the expense of complying
with discovery requests . . . .”).
63. See Zubulake v. UBS Warburg LLC, 216 F.R.D. 280, 284 (S.D.N.Y. 2003) (Zubulake
III) (“[C]ost-shifting is potentially appropriate only when inaccessible data is sought. When a
discovery request seeks accessible data—for example, active on-line or near-line data—it is typi-
cally inappropriate to consider cost-shifting.”).
64. See In re Two Appeals Arising Out of San Juan Dupont Plaza Hotel Fire Litig., 994 F.2d
956, 965 (1st Cir. 1993) (“Rule 26(f) expressly authorizes trial judges, following discovery con-
ferences, to enter orders for ‘the allocation of expenses as are necessary for the proper manage-
ment of discovery.’”).
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will inevitably file time-consuming and expensive motions to compel or
motions for sanctions.65 The Sedona Conference66 has recognized that co-
operation between opposing counsel can greatly reduce the overall cost of
litigation.67 Thus, if parties agree to forensically image relevant online stor-
age devices and work cooperatively to set the search parameters, forensic
imaging could reduce the overall cost of litigation.68
B. Privilege and Work Product
Parties often object to forensic imaging on the ground that an opponent
could gain access to material that is privileged or protected by the work
product doctrine.69 There are methods parties can employ, however, to en-
sure that privileged or work-product-protected material is not produced.
This section will explain how parties can protect the inadvertent production
of privileged and work-product-protected material when forensic imaging is
part of the discovery process.
Because courts differ in their treatment of inadvertently produced priv-
ileged or protected material, attorneys need to be familiar with their juris-
65. See, e.g., Zubulake v. UBS Warburg LLC, 217 F.R.D. 309 (S.D.N.Y. 2003) (Zubulake I).
In the Zubulake cases cited throughout this note, UBS failed to preserve and produce relevant e-
mails after they reasonably anticipated a lawsuit in an employee discrimination case. Zubulake
was forced to file repeated motions to compel and motions for sanctions as a result of UBS’
actions. Consequently, the discovery process dragged on for years. In the end, UBS was ordered to
produce, at great expense, responsive e-mails from backup tapes. Id. at 324. UBS was also re-
quired to pay the costs for re-depositions required by the late production and received a sanction
in the form of an adverse inference jury instruction with respect to the deleted e-mails. Zubulake
v. UBS Warburg LLC, 229 F.R.D. 422, 437–38 (S.D.N.Y. 2004) (Zubulake V). See also 33 AM.
JUR. 3D Proof of Facts § 1 (2009) (noting the trend toward severe sanctions for discovery failure
since the Supreme Court decided Nat’l Hockey League v. Metro. Hockey Club, 427 U.S. 639
(1976)). In National Hockey League, the Supreme Court strongly upheld a district court’s order
and dismissal of plaintiff’s case for failing to comply with a discovery order in timely fashion and
encouraged similar action in other cases. Id. at 643.
66. The Sedona Conference is a highly regarded legal think tank that brings together leading
jurists, lawyers, experts, and other professionals to promote the best practices and to otherwise
move the law forward in a just and reasonable way. The Sedona Conference, http://www.the
sedonaconference.org/ (last visited March 29, 2010).
67. William Butterfield, The Case for Cooperation, 10 SEDONA CONF. J. 339, 356–59 (2009)
(noting that cooperation in discovery and zealous advocacy are not conflicting concepts and coop-
eration between counsel allows parties, among other things, to save money).
68. See Victor Stanley, Inc. v. Creative Pipe, Inc., 250 F.R.D. 251, 261 n.10 (D. Md. 2008)
(order denying defendant’s assertion of attorney-client privilege) (“[P]arties worried about the cost
of employing properly designed search and information retrieval methods have an incentive to
keep the costs of this phase of discovery as low as possible, including attempting to confer with
their opposing party in an effort to identify a mutually agreeable search and retrieval method. This
minimizes cost because if the method is approved, there will be no dispute resolving its suffi-
ciency, and doing it right the first time is always cheaper than doing it over if ordered to do so by
the court.”).
69. See, e.g., Cenveo Corp. v. Slater, No. 06-CV-2632, 2007 WL 442387, at *1 (E.D. Pa.
Jan. 31, 2007) (“Defendants’ [sic] oppose the imaging method primarily on the grounds that it
might result in the disclosure of privileged information.”).
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diction’s rules.70 One way to minimize the risk of waiving privilege,
regardless of the jurisdictional rules, is to use a claw-back agreement.71
Claw-back agreements protect responding parties from the most damaging
consequences of inadvertent waiver by allowing them to “claw-back” the
privileged material within a given time frame.72 Claw-back agreements can
either be court ordered73 or take the form of a private agreement between
litigating parties.74 Some claw-back agreements are so thorough that they
do away with the need for privilege review altogether.75 To ensure the
timely implementation of a claw-back agreement, parties can stipulate to a
claw-back agreement at the initial discovery conference, which they can
later adopt as a case management order.76
When forensic imaging is or could be a factor in discovery, parties can
explicitly agree that any privileged or protected information viewed by a
third party vendor does not waive the privilege.77 However, absent an addi-
tional agreement, a producing party must still review documents to screen
for protected material.78
70. Victor Stanley, 250 F.R.D. at 257 (explaining the three ways courts decide if inadvertent
production of protected or privileged material constitutes a waiver).
71. Claw-back agreements are also called non-waiver agreements.
72. Hopson v. Mayor of Balt., 232 F.R.D. 228, 232 (D. Md. 2005) (providing a detailed
analysis of court-sanctioned agreements to prevent waiver after inadvertent production in cases
involving large amounts of discoverable ESI).
73. FED. R. EVID. 502(d) (“A federal court order that the attorney-client privilege or work
product protection is not waived as a result of disclosure in connection with the litigation pending
before the court governs all persons or entities in all state or federal proceedings, whether or not
they were parties to the matter before the court, if the order incorporates the agreement of the
parties before the court.”).
74. FED. R. EVID. 502(e) (“An agreement on the effect of disclosure of a communication or
information covered by the attorney-client privilege or work product protection is binding on the
parties to the agreement, but not on other parties unless the agreement is incorporated into a court
order.”).
75. Zubulake v. UBS Warburg LLC, 216 F.R.D. 280, 290 (S.D.N.Y. 2003) (Zubulake III)
(“[M]any parties to document-intensive litigation enter into so-called ‘claw-back’ agreements to
allow the parties to forego privilege review altogether in favor of an agreement to return inadver-
tently produced privileged documents.”). However, under the Federal Rules of Evidence, only
those agreements that are court-ordered are enforceable against third parties and parties not pres-
ently involved in the action. See FED. R. EVID. 502(d). If a non-waiver agreement is merely a
private agreement between two or more parties, it is not enforceable against third parties. Thus, in
order to guarantee the effectiveness of a claw-back agreement, litigating parties should have their
agreement adopted by the trial judge in the form of an order.
76. FED. R. EVID. 502(d).
77. See, e.g., Ferron v. Search Cactus, L.L.C., No. 2:06-CV-327, 2008 WL 1902499, at *2
(S.D. Ohio Apr. 28, 2008).
78. Id. at *4 (“Plaintiff shall identify for deletion any information that is irrelevant and create
a specific privilege log . . . . The expert shall remove the information claimed as privileged and
provide all other information to Defendants.”).
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C. Relevance and Privacy
Two final, closely related objections to direct access for purposes of
forensic imaging are relevance79 and privacy.80 Private or personal informa-
tion is rarely relevant in litigation and has the potential to expose litigants to
unnecessary embarrassment or harassment. Today, hard drives that have a
storage capacity of 100 gigabytes or greater are not uncommon and the
price of storing data in an online or near-line format has dramatically de-
creased.81 The amount of potentially discoverable ESI on an average per-
sonal computer is staggering.82 Many people use their computers for a
variety of functions including work, entertainment, communication, and
personal accounts management.83 All but a small—albeit critical—percent-
age of ESI is likely discoverable on any given computer. The goal of dis-
covery, then, is to identify, collect, and cull responsive documents from a
larger institutional data universe and then search for and retrieve all rele-
vant, non-privileged data.84 An essential method to reach this goal on any
storage device, whether it is forensically imaged or not, is to target specific
concepts or terms through the use of keyword searches.85
Keyword searches identify all documents containing a specified term
regardless of context.86 Therefore, in all but the most straightforward elec-
79. Hedenburg v. Aramark Am. Food Servs., No. C06-5267 RBL, 2007 WL 162716, at *1
(W.D. Wash. Jan. 17, 2007) (plaintiff objected to defendant’s demand to mirror plaintiff’s hard
drive after plaintiff had already produced in good faith all relevant ESI. “Plaintiff objects to the
discovery as a ‘fishing expedition’ and has to date refused to permit the Defendant from accessing
her home computer’s hard drive.”).
80. See, e.g., Capital Records, Inc. v. Alaujan, Nos. 03CV11661-NG, 07cv11446-NG, 2009
WL 1292977, at *2 (D. Mass. May 6, 2009) (stating that the “principal issue in these cases [in-
volving court-mandated forensic imaging] centers instead on concerns for defendant’s privacy
. . . .”).
81. The Sedona Conference, The Sedona Conference Best Practices Commentary on the Use
of Search and Information Retrieval Methods in E-Discovery, 8 SEDONA CONF. J. 189, 192 (2007)
[hereinafter Retrieval Methods] (“In 1990, a typical gigabyte of storage cost about $20,000; today
it costs less than $1 dollar [sic].”).
82. Manual for Complex Litigation (Fourth) § 11.446 (2010) (“One gigabyte is the
equivalent of 500,000 typewritten pages. Large corporate computer networks create backup data
measured in terabytes, or 1,000,000 megabytes; each terabyte represents the equivalent of 500
billion typewritten pages of plain text.”).
83. In allowing defendant direct access to the plaintiff’s computer for forensic imaging, the
judge divided the information on plaintiff’s computer into three categories: (1) information related
to the representation of clients in other cases, (2) personal information, and (3) information related
to e-mail and website advertising litigation. Of the three categories, only the third was relevant
and thus discoverable. Ferron v. Search Cactus, L.L.C., No. 2:06-CV-327, 2008 WL 1902499, at
*1 (S.D. Ohio Apr. 28, 2008).
84. Achieving Quality, supra note 47, at 201.
85. See Retrieval Methods, supra note 81, at 194 (“In many settings involving electronically
stored information, reliance solely on a manual search process for the purpose of finding respon-
sive documents may be infeasible or unwarranted. In such cases, the use of automated search
methods should be viewed as reasonable, valuable, and even necessary.”).
86. Id. at 201 (illustrating that a search for “the term ‘strike’ could be found in documents
relating to a labor union tactic, a military action, options trading, or baseball, to name just a few
. . . .”).
2010] DISCOVERY OF ELECTRONICALLY STORED INFORMATION 739
tronic discovery, the key to a successful and targeted keyword search is
precision.87 Poorly planned keyword searches not only fail to return an ac-
ceptable amount of relevant ESI, but they also waste the court’s time88 and
increase the producing party’s risk of turning over privilege or work-prod-
uct-protected documents.89 Keyword searches are not without limitations,90
but these limitations may be somewhat mitigated through the sampling
process.
The use of sampling in the ESI discovery process is particularly effec-
tive in improving quality and reducing costs.91 Simply put, sampling uses a
specified or random subset of a population as a representative example of
the whole population.92 After a party has run a series of specified keyword
searches and reviewed the results of the searches, sampling allows a pro-
ducing party to determine the likelihood that the search was effective. At-
torneys can accomplish this by comparing the prevalence of targeted search
terms in the designated batch to a random sampling of all ESI across
targeted storage devices.93 While sampling does not guarantee that all non-
relevant or private ESI has been identified or filtered out, it minimizes risk
and serves as a best practice in the discovery of ESI.94
The courts have adapted to the privacy and relevance perils inherent in
direct access orders by developing robust protective orders.95 Key compo-
nents of such orders require that the requesting party’s forensic experts: (1)
sign a confidentiality agreement agreed to by both parties and submit to the
court’s protective order, (2) image relevant devices at their primary loca-
tions under supervision of opposing counsel, (3) maintain exclusive control
over imaged devices, (4) search only potentially relevant sectors of the fo-
rensically imaged devices, (5) produce a written report of all potentially
87. Id. (“[T]he experience of many litigators is that simple keyword searching alone is inade-
quate . . . .”).
88. See William A. Gross Constr. Assocs., Inc. v. Am. Mfrs. Mut. Ins. Co., 256 F.R.D. 134,
135 (S.D.N.Y. 2009) (“This case is just the latest example of lawyers designing keyword searches
in the dark, by the seat of the pants, without adequate (indeed, here, apparently without any)
discussion with those who wrote the emails.”).
89. Victor Stanley, Inc. v. Creative Pipe, Inc., 250 F.R.D. 251, 256–57 (D. Md. 2008) (deny-
ing defendant’s assertion of attorney-client privilege where defendant failed to secure a claw-back
agreement and, because of overly broad search terms, produced a host of privileged documents. In
the ruling judge’s words, “[W]hile it is universally acknowledged that keyword searches are use-
ful tools for search and retrieval of ESI, all keyword searches are not created equal . . . .”).
90. See Retrieval Methods, supra note 81, at 201–02, for a comprehensive critique of
keyword search technology.
91. Achieving Quality, supra note 47, at 326.
92. Id.
93. Id. at 329.
94. See Retrieval Methods, supra note 81, at 217–22, for a good explanation of technological
advancements in search and retrieval technology.
95. Capital Records, Inc. v. Alaujan, Nos. 03CV11661-NG, 07cv11446-NG, 2009 WL
1292977, at *2–3 (D. Mass. May 6, 2009); see also Ameriwood Indus., Inc. v. Liberman, No.
4:06CV524-DJS, 2006 WL 3825291, at *5 (E.D. Mo. Dec. 27, 2006).
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relevant documents for inspection only by the producing party, and (6) re-
quire in camera review of any contentious documents.96
When properly utilized, the advances in search retrieval technology,
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, and the vigorously developed judicial
protective orders work remarkably well to control litigation costs and pro-
tect privileged, private, or protected material. Attorneys can forensically
image relevant storage devices to protect their clients from sanctions and
the astronomical costs of discovery disputes. When forensic examination of
the imaged drives is necessary, producing parties can be assured that the
examination will not result in a “fishing expedition” or an unwarranted in-
vasion of non-relevant, private information. The totality of rules, technol-
ogy, and judicial orders developed specifically for e-discovery make
forensic imaging a best practice in many disputes involving the discovery of
electronically stored information.
IV. BEST PRACTICE: IMAGING RELEVANT DIGITAL STORAGE MEDIA
Litigants are generally free to choose how to manage electronic data.97
As the cost, complexity, and volume of e-discovery increase, however, par-
ties to a lawsuit must have procedures that ensure discovery responses are
adequate.98 When counsel and the parties they represent fail to adequately
preserve and produce responsive, non-privileged ESI, the results tend to be
increasingly disastrous.99 The duty to preserve and produce documents ulti-
mately falls on the party-client.100 Attorneys should develop methods to
help protect their clients from unnecessary hardship resulting from discov-
ery violations. Forensic imaging is one easy and relatively inexpensive
method attorneys can use to ensure their clients’ documents are adequately
preserved and produced. This section proposes, as a best practice for com-
petently managing e-discovery, that attorneys should forensically image all
relevant digital storage devices after they reasonably anticipate litigation in
any case where forensic imaging is an appropriate and realistic option.
A. The Zubulake Requirements
In her final Zubulake opinion, Judge Scheindlin highlights the steps
counsel should take to ensure compliance with their clients’ preservation
96. Capital Records, Inc., 2009 WL 1292977, at *2–3.
97. Zubulake v. UBS Warburg LLC, 220 F.R.D. 212, 218 (S.D.N.Y. 2003) (Zubulake IV).
98. See Achieving Quality, supra note 47, at 302.
99. See, e.g., United States v. Philip Morris USA Inc., 327 F. Supp. 2d 21, 26 n.1 (D.D.C.
2004) (“Philip Morris identified eleven corporate managers and/or officers who failed to comply
with the ‘print and retain’” preservation order. Consequently, each “individual is being sanctioned
in the amount of $250,000.”); Bray & Gillespie Mgmt., LLC v. Lexington Ins. Co., No. 6:07-cv-
0222-Orl-35KRS, 2010 WL 55595, at *6–7 (M.D. Fla. Jan. 5, 2010) (sanctioning plaintiff’s dis-
covery failures by dismissing the action with prejudice and awarding defendants $75,000.00 in
attorney’s fees and costs associated with pursuing the motion for sanctions).
100. Zubulake v. UBS Warburg LLC, 229 F.R.D. 422, 436 (S.D.N.Y. 2004) (Zubulake V).
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obligations.101 First, counsel should issue a litigation hold at the outset of
litigation or when litigation is reasonably anticipated.102 Second, counsel
must identify and communicate directly with key players. This entails in-
forming key players of the exact nature and duty of the litigation hold to
ensure full compliance and preservation.103 Third, attorneys should instruct
all employees to preserve and produce their relevant files.104 Finally, Judge
Scheindlin advises counsel to locate, label, and safe-keep all backup media,
which the party is required to maintain.105 This last requirement may be
read to require, as a best practice, that attorneys image and protect relevant
digital storage devices as part of a normal litigation hold.
The primary difference between data stored on backup tapes or similar
devices and data stored on a forensically imaged device is that the former is
generally categorized as inaccessible.106 Retrieving inaccessible data is la-
borious and time consuming. In Zubulake and many other ESI disputes,
several key players deleted relevant e-mails from their computers after they
were informed of a litigation hold.107 The e-mails were stored on backup
tapes, however, and UBS was ordered to produce the e-mails from the
backup tapes—at great cost.
Despite the key players’ malfeasance, UBS could have maintained and
produced the relevant deleted e-mails quickly and cheaply if counsel had
immediately imaged each key-player’s hard drive(s).108 Data that is stored
on an imaged drive and is neither deleted nor fragmented is readily accessi-
ble because it is maintained in an online format.109 This means that parties
can quickly and cheaply produce relevant, non-privileged documents. Addi-
tionally, counsel could have accomplished this feat with little or no disrup-
tion to the daily business practices of UBS.110 Thus, forensic imaging of
relevant storage devices at the onset of litigation serves two important and
essential functions: first, it ensures the preservation of relevant ESI despite
any attempt by an unethical client to destroy or conceal discoverable ESI;
second, when a client or a client’s employees do attempt to delete or con-
101. Id. at 433–34.
102. Id. at 433.
103. Id. at 433–34.
104. Id. at 434.
105. Id. (“By taking possession of, or otherwise safeguarding, all potentially relevant backup
tapes, counsel eliminates the possibility that such tapes will be inadvertently recycled.”).
106. Zubulake v. UBS Warburg LLC, 217 F.R.D. 309, 319–20 (S.D.N.Y. 2003) (Zubulake I);
see also notes 50–53 and accompanying text.
107. Zubulake, 217 F.R.D. at 318.
108. To control costs and maximize effectiveness, imaging should be limited to key players’
storage devices unless it is apparent that other employees possess a repository of relevant discov-
erable information on their computers.
109. See Zubulake, 217 F.R.D. at 318–319.
110. See, e.g., Covad Commc’ns. Co. v. Revonet, Inc., 258 F.R.D. 5, 10–11 (D.D.C. 2009)
(describing any interference of business operations as “insignificant” because imaging can be
done at night or on weekends when employees are out of the office).
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ceal discoverable data that is later requested, the forensically imaged drive
will save the client from sanctions and the time and expense it would take
to restore the deleted e-mails from backup tapes or forensic reconstruction.
B. Zubulake Revisited: Failure to Image Relevant Digital Storage
Devices as Potential Negligence Under Pension Committee
Six years after Judge Scheindlin issued the Zubulake opinions, she ap-
plied the well-known tort concepts of negligence, gross negligence, and
willfulness in a discovery context to determine each litigant’s relative cul-
pability for failing to follow putatively established discovery rules.111 Once
a discovery duty is well established, the failure to adhere to that standard
can be considered grossly negligent.112 Since it is now abundantly clear that
litigating parties have a duty to preserve all responsive, non-privileged in-
formation, a failure to preserve evidence resulting in its loss or destruction
is surely negligent and may be grossly negligent.113
The simplicity and straightforwardness embodied in the duty to pre-
serve relevant, non-privileged ESI raises the level of acceptable conduct in
the discovery phase of litigation. Pension Committee makes explicit that
conduct that may have been acceptable or at least pardonable in the past
may no longer pass muster.114 It is equally clear that attorneys need to un-
equivocally inform all key players of their duties to preserve and to turn
over potentially relevant documents to counsel. In complex litigation in-
volving dozens of key players and an exponentially larger number of em-
ployees, all of whom may be required to produce relevant ESI, it is
impossible for even a team of attorneys to ensure that their preservation
orders are being dutifully followed. This does not exculpate the client for
discovery abuses, however, nor counsel for failing to monitor execution of
the hold as closely as possible.
Under Pension Committee, clients will continue to face stiff sanctions
for failing to preserve responsive ESI.115 Framed a different way, Pension
Committee demands that attorneys find better prophylactic measures to pre-
111. Pension Comm. Univ. of Montreal Pension Plan v. Banc of Am. Sec., LLC, 685 F. Supp.
2d 456, 463–67 (S.D.N.Y. 2010).
112. Id. at 470–73.
113. Id. at 464–65.
114. Since its release, Pension Committee and its requirements for competent e-discovery
have been widely cited to justify sanctions for discovery abuses. See, e.g., Merck Eprova AG v.
Gnosis, S.P.A., No. 07 Civ. 5898(RJS), 2010 WL 1631519, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 20, 2010) (stat-
ing that the court agrees with the analytical framework set forth in Pension Committee and will
rely on it to determine sanctions in the principal case).
115. Medcorp Inc. v. Pinpoint Techs., Inc., No. 08-cv-00867-MSK-KLM, 2010 WL 2500301,
at *2 (D. Colo. June 15, 2010) (“The parties and special master agree that the standards set forth in
Pension Committee of the University of Montreal Pension Plan v. Banc of America Securities, 685
F.Supp.2d 456 (S.D.N.Y. 2010) provides the appropriate analysis regarding the types of sanctions
which are justified when a party destroys evidence.”).
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vent their clients from losing or destroying ESI.116 For the reasons already
stated in part A of this section, forensic imaging is one such measure. Se-
cured possession of timely imaged storage devices greatly reduces the risk
of spoliation of relevant ESI and subsequent sanctions. Attorneys should
think of forensic imaging as the ultimate discovery compliance and insur-
ance measure.
V. WHEN ALL ELSE FAILS: IMAGING AN OPPONENT’S DIGITAL
STORAGE DEVICES BY ORDER OR AGREEMENT
The obstacles and objections to mirror imaging relevant storage de-
vices are potentially well founded, but ultimately surmountable. When an
opposing party fails to adequately preserve relevant ESI, knowledge of
these possible pitfalls is necessary for any attorney seeking direct access.
Recall that the minor thesis of this note is that in certain circumstances,
courts should liberally allow direct access to targeted storage devices for the
purpose of forensically imaging and searching those devices. This section
will explore and explain the circumstances that often necessitate the need
for direct access. The goal is to show that direct access is an appropriate
remedy. All of these circumstances could be avoided, or, under Pension
Committee, are at least negligent and are therefore inexcusable, if the pro-
ducing party had adequately preserved and produced available ESI at the
outset of litigation. Consequently, the receiving party deserves to access
evidence that may be critical to its case, while the culpable party has in
effect given up its right to control ESI in its possession.
A. No Automatic Right to Direct Access
The rules governing the discovery of ESI are on equal footing with
traditional discovery rules.117 This means that without a qualifying reason,
parties have no automatic right to image their opponent’s hard drives.118
Typically, parties will request direct access when they believe that the other
party has failed to preserve or produce all relevant documents.119 A party
116. See Field Day, LLC v. Cnty. of Suffolk, No. 04-2202, 2010 WL 1286622, at *13
(E.D.N.Y. Mar. 25, 2010) (denying plaintiff’s motion for sanctions and explaining that the law
with respect to litigation holds and the preservation of electronically stored information developed
in Pension Committee was not applicable at the time of the conduct in question).
117. PSEG Power N.Y., Inc. v. Alberici Constructors, Inc., No. 1:05-CV-657(DNH/RFT),
2007 WL 2687670, at *5 (N.D.N.Y. Sept. 7, 2007) (“[F]ormer rules of discovery engagement are
not remarkably different than the amended rules.”). In 2006, the Federal Rules were amended to
specifically address discovery of electronically stored information.
118. Scotts v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., No. 2:06-CV-899, 2007 WL 1723509, at *2 (S.D. Ohio
June 12, 2007) (“[W]ithout a qualifying reason, plaintiff is no more entitled to access to defen-
dant’s electronic information storage systems than to defendant’s warehouses storing paper
documents.”).
119. See, e.g., Antioch Co. v. Scrapbook Borders, Inc., 210 F.R.D. 645, 651 (D. Minn. 2002)
(where plaintiffs sought direct access to defendant’s computers after making a good faith determi-
nation that relevant documents were being deleted); Koosharem Corp. v. Spec Pers., LLC, No.
744 UNIVERSITY OF ST. THOMAS LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 7:3
may also seek direct access to simply learn how the information is stored on
a given system.120 Mere skepticism over whether a party has produced all
responsive, non-privileged ESI is not enough to gain direct access.121 If the
courts are going to become more generous in granting direct access, attor-
neys need to aid judges through clear, informative motions.122 Parties wish-
ing to compel direct access must satisfactorily prove their case with
concrete evidence such as sworn expert affidavits, deposition transcripts,
and other documents.123
B. Petitioning the Court
In order to gain direct access to an opponent’s digital storage devices,
counsel must usually petition the court in a motion to compel. Rule
37(a)(3)(B) allows a requesting party to move for disclosure if a party fails
to answer a question asked under Rule 30 or 31, fails to make a designation
under Rule 30(b)(6), fails to respond to a discovery request, or fails to per-
mit inspection as requested under Rule 34.124 The timing of a motion to
compel is case specific, but a requesting party should have made all reason-
able good faith efforts to obtain the requested documents before filing the
motion.125
To ensure that a motion to compel is successful, a requesting party
must be sure to build an adequate record through carefully crafted interrog-
atories, requests for production, and depositions.126 Attorneys managing the
discovery phase of a lawsuit should act under the assumption that there will
6:08-583-HFF-WMC, 2008 WL 4458864, at *1–2 (D.S.C. Sept. 29, 2008) (granting plaintiff’s
request to forensically image defendants’ hard drives where defendants failed to produce relevant
requested documents in their original, unaltered form).
120. See, e.g., G.D. v. Monarch Plastic Surgery, P.A., 239 F.R.D. 641, 643 (D. Kan. 2007)
(where plaintiffs successfully sought direct access to defendant’s computers to determine a com-
puters operating system, applicable software application, and explore how files were kept and
identified).
121. McCurdy Grp., LLC, v. Am. Biomedical Grp., Inc., 9 Fed. App’x. 822, 831 (10th Cir.
2001) (skepticism over whether a party has produced all responsive, non-privileged ESI is an
insufficient reason to warrant production of hard drives); In re Weekley Homes, L.P., 295 S.W.3d
309, 320 (Tex. 2009) (“HFG’s conclusory statements that the deleted emails it seeks ‘must exist’
and that deleted emails are in some cases recoverable is not enough to justify the [mirror imaging]
method of discovery the trial court ordered. . . . The missing step is a demonstration that the
particularities of Weekley’s electronic information storage methodology will allow retrieval of
emails that have been deleted or overwritten, and what that retrieval will entail.”).
122. Aaron Philipp, Electronic Discovery: Strategy Plays a Key Role in Computer Forensics,
NAT’L L.J., Mar. 19, 2007 (“Justification and precision in court orders is paramount.”).
123. See Mark Kosieradzki, It’s All in the Documents: The Discovery Rules Work Best When
They Work Together, 41 TRIAL 7 (July 2005), for a very informative article on thwarting opposing
counsel’s attempt to conceal documents and otherwise subvert the discovery process.
124. FED. R. CIV. P. 37.
125. FED. R. CIV. P. 37(a)(1). But see PCS Phosphate Co., Inc. v. Norfolk S. Corp., 238
F.R.D. 555, 558 (E.D.N.C. 2006) (motions to compel should be filed before the close of discovery
or they may be waived).
126. Kosieradzki, supra note 123.
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be a discovery challenge to every aspect of the process.127 The “Death Star”
deposition is one particularly effective means of building such a record.128
A Death Star deposition combines Rules 30(b)(2), 30(b)(6), and 34
and forces a corporate designee to bring all requested documents to an oral
deposition.129 At a minimum, requests for production should specifically
inquire about an institution’s managerial structure, including the identifica-
tion of key players; a detailed map of an organization’s information sys-
tems—IT infrastructure, system capabilities, and possible locations or
sources of stored information—including individual work computers, home
computers, e-mail servers, DMS servers, financial systems, backup servers,
corporate firewall, networks, external storage drives, PDA devices, and
voicemail; an institution’s document retention policy; and steps an organi-
zation has taken to preserve relevant ESI after it reasonably anticipated liti-
gation.130 By combining an oral deposition with a document request, the
deposing attorney is able to determine if all relevant documents were pro-
duced and inquire about the precise nature of the requested documents
under oath.
If the deposing attorney discovers that the producing party has failed to
produce a meaningful number of relevant, producible requested documents,
and those documents are not timely produced, she now has a thorough re-
cord to use in a Rule 37 motion to compel. This motion should clearly
articulate the relationship between a party’s claims and the ESI sought.131
For example, the motion should articulate that a deponent has explained
under oath that a series of relevant requested e-mails were exchanged
among key players but were not produced after repeated requests.132 The
motion should also request direct access for the purpose of obtaining a fo-
rensic image. Attorneys should explain exactly what forensic imaging is
and what it can accomplish.133 This entails providing the judge with the
expert’s qualifications and should include an expert affidavit detailing the
127. Achieving Quality, supra note 47, at 313.
128. Kosieradzki, supra note 123.
129. Id.
130. Jennifer E. Lacroix, Practical Guidelines for Managing eDiscovery Without Breaking the
Bank, 922 PRAC. LAW INST. 645, 651–52 (2008).
131. Cenveo Corp. v. Slater, No. 06-CV-2632, 2007 WL 442387, at *2 (E.D. Pa. Jan. 31,
2007).
132. See Zubulake v. UBS Warburg LLC, 217 F.R.D. 309, 313 (S.D.N.Y. 2003) (Zubulake I)
(“In fact, Zubulake knew that that there were additional responsive e-mails that UBS had failed to
produce because she herself had produced approximately 450 pages of e-mail correspondence.
Clearly, numerous responsive e-mails had been created and deleted . . . .”).
133. Philipp, supra note 122 (“Lawyers should understand how the computer-forensics tech-
nique they want to employ fits into the larger picture and what data are required to investigate that
avenue fully, and then structure the order for that data using the rules of best evidence and the
Federal Rules of Evidence.”).
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same. The motion should also specify in detail the exact imaging and search
protocol to be used and include steps to prevent inadvertent disclosure.134
C. Third Party Vendors and Costs
The process of forensically examining or searching a digital storage
device requires extensive technological expertise and is beyond the ken of
all but a handful of attorneys and judges.135 Attorneys will often need the
assistance of a third party vendor136 to image and search relevant digital
storage devices.137 When selecting a third party vendor, it is best to cooper-
ate with opposing counsel to mutually agree on a specified vendor. If par-
ties cannot agree on a chosen vendor and an adversary challenges the
proposed vendor, the selecting party “should expect to support their posi-
tion with affidavits or other equivalent information from persons with the
requisite qualifications and experience, based on sufficient facts or data and
using reliable principles or methodology.”138 Deciding which party will pay
for the forensic search is often a point of much contention in any successful
motion to gain direct access.
Although it is relatively inexpensive to forensically image a digital
storage device, it is very expensive to hire an expert to forensically search
or examine the imaged device.139 Thus, seeking a motion to compel direct
access to an opponent’s digital storage devices often triggers proportionality
concerns articulated in Zubulake and other cases.140 Additionally, the 2006
advisory notes to Rule 26 articulate a seven-part test to determine whether
cost shifting is appropriate.141 If the court does not order the producing
134. See Ferron v. Search Cactus, L.L.C., No. 2:06-CV-327, 2008 WL 1902499, at *5 (S.D.
Ohio Apr. 28, 2008) (laying out the exact protocol party was to follow when imaging opponent’s
hard drive).
135. Equity Analytics, LLC v. Lundin, 248 F.R.D. 331, 333 (D.D.C. 2008); Victor Stanley,
Inc. v. Creative Pipe, Inc., 250 F.R.D. 251, 261 n.10 (D. Md. 2008) (explaining that ESI motions
often involve complex scientific determinations, which attorneys need to be able to explain
through expert affidavits or other means to enable the ruling judge to make a reasonable, informed
decision).
136. See Mathew I. Cohen et al., Best Practices for the Selection of Electronic Discovery
Vendors: Navigating the Vendor Proposal Process, THE SEDONA CONFERENCE WORKING GROUP
SERIES (2007), for a helpful treatise on navigating the vendor and selection process.
137. Here, a “vendor” means a non-party that is hired to provide forensic examination services
for the purpose of litigation.
138. Victor Stanley, 250 F.R.D. at 261 n.10 (explaining that ESI motions often involve com-
plex scientific determinations, which attorneys need to be able to explain through expert affidavits
or other means to enable the ruling judge to make a reasonable, informed decision).
139. Covad Commc’ns Co. v. Revonet, Inc., 258 F.R.D. 5, 10 (D.D.C. 2009).
140. See Zubulake v. UBS Warburg LLC, 216 F.R.D. 280, 284 (S.D.N.Y. 2003) (Zubulake
III); see also PSEG Power N.Y., Inc. v. Alberici Constructors, Inc., No. 1:05-CV-657 (DNH/
RFT), 2007 WL 2687670, at *8 (N.D.N.Y. Sept. 7, 2007) (“In addressing electronic discovery and
the rising cost to produce, common law has crafted a cost shifting scheme which is based on FED.
R. CIV. P. 26(c).”).
141. The seven part test articulated in the 2006 advisory notes is as follows: (1) the specificity
of the discovery request, (2) the quantity of the information available from other more easily
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party to pay for the forensic search,142 requesting parties should be willing
to pay for all or part of the costs associated with hiring a forensic expert to
increase their odds of a successful motion to compel.143 In most instances
where the requesting party is ordered to pay all or part of the costs for
production, the litigating parties agree that forensic analysis is essential to
proper discovery, but the producing party has not intentionally or negli-
gently destroyed any responsive ESI.144
Parties who are ordered or agree to produce digital storage devices for
forensic imaging often seek protection from the court to avoid waiver of
attorney-client privilege, work product doctrine, and the production of trade
secrets or non-responsive ESI.145 Fear of waiver is particularly fierce where
producing parties are required to submit their digital storage devices to a
non-party forensic examiner. However, in what has been described as a
“seminal”146 case on protecting a producing party from inadvertent waiver
and disclosure in the e-discovery context, Hopson v. Mayor & City Council
of Baltimore provides a judicially imposed safety mechanism to ensure that
the rights and privileges of the producing party are adequately
maintained.147
accessed sources, (3) the failure to produce relevant information that seems likely to have existed
but is no longer available on more easily accessed sources, (4) the likelihood of finding relevant,
responsive information that cannot be obtained from other more easily accessed sources, (5) pre-
dictions as to the importance of and usefulness of further information, (6) the importance of issues
at stake in litigation, and (7) the parties’ resources. PSEG Power N.Y., Inc., 2007 WL 2687670, at
*11.
142. Ameriwood Indus., Inc. v. Liberman, No. 4:06CV524-DJS, 2006 WL 3825291, at *5
(E.D. Mo. Dec. 27, 2006) (“In performing good-cause inquiry, the Court is also permitted to set
conditions for discovery, including but not limited to payment by the requesting party of part or all
of the reasonable costs . . . .”).
143. See Antioch Co. v. Scrapbook Borders, Inc., 210 F.R.D. 645, 652 n.6 (D. Minn. 2002)
(stating that the court is not required to consider cost-shifting measures where the requesting party
offers to pay all costs associated with forensically searching an opponent’s hard drive).
144. See, e.g., Playboy Enters., Inc. v. Welles, 60 F. Supp. 2d 1050, 1053 (S.D. Cal. 1999)
(granting plaintiff’s request for direct access, but ordering that the plaintiff is required to pay for
the forensic analysis due to Rule 26(b)(2)(B)’s undue burden/cost limitation); Equity Analytics,
LLC v. Lundin, 248 F.R.D. 331, 334 (D.D.C. 2008) (where, in the interest of prompt resolution to
a discovery dispute involving plaintiff’s request to forensically image defendant’s hard drive, the
ruling judge stated, “My order will also provide that the cost of the examination will be borne by
[plaintiff] and that it may not seek to recover that cost from [defendant] at any time or for any
purpose.”).
145. See supra notes 16–19 and accompanying text.
146. Equity Analytics, 248 F.R.D. at 334.
147. 232 F.R.D. 228, 239–40 (D. Md. 2005). Given the importance of the Hopson’s judicially
imposed safety valve, it is necessary to quote part of the opinion in length: “Despite the uncer-
tainty regarding which approach to inadvertent disclosure of attorney-client privileged material
would be adopted by the Fourth Circuit, there is a viable method of dealing with the practical
challenges to privilege review of electronically stored information without running an unaccept-
able risk of subject-matter waiver. It lies with the courts issuing scheduling orders under
Fed.R.Civ.P. 16, protective orders under Fed.R.Civ.P. 26(c), or discovery management orders
under Fed.R.Civ.P. 26(b)(2) that incorporate procedures under which electronic records will be
produced without waiving privilege or work product that the courts have determined to be reason-
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Further, judges are able to appoint third party vendors as officers of the
court,148 which obliges the forensic experts to abide by the same rules and
procedures as an attorney.149 This exposes the forensic examiner to the pos-
sibility of tremendous sanctions or liability should she violate any court
rules or provisions of the court order.
VI. CONCLUSION
Discovery failures involving ESI are on the rise, and the redundancy of
cases in which a party or a party’s employees have failed to preserve or
produce relevant ESI reveals that an unacceptable number of civil litigants
and litigators still suffer from a poor appreciation of their court-mandated
duties. Cost-conscious clients and overworked judges are demanding that
attorneys develop novel approaches to solve litigation problems.150 Compe-
tent and ethical representation now requires that attorneys adapt to the sig-
nificant challenges brought about by the inexorable growth of ESI. Forensic
imaging at or prior to the onset of litigation can solve many of the discovery
related abuses that unnecessarily waste the court’s time, prevent the merit-
based adjudication of issues, and wantonly increase a client’s costs. Further,
judges should liberally allow forensic imaging where a party fails to live up
to its discovery duties. These proposals serve to protect client and attorney
alike, while acknowledging that the status quo is no longer tenable.
able given the nature of the case, and that have been agreed to by the parties. This practice,
already commonly followed in cases where discovery of electronic records is anticipated, is spe-
cifically encouraged by the proposed rule changes to the discovery rules now under review by the
Supreme Court.”
In 2006, the Supreme Court adopted the proposed amendments to the Federal Rules. Among the
new changes was FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(3)(B), which states: “If the court orders discovery of those
materials, it must protect against the disclosure of the mental impressions, conclusions, opinions,
or legal theories of a party’s attorney or other representative concerning litigation.” See also
Sharon Nelson & John Simek, New Federal Rules of Evidence: An ESI Primer, 32 LAW PRAC. 23,
23 (2006).
148. “A person who is charged with upholding the law and administering the judicial system.
Typically, officer of the court refers to a judge, clerk, bailiff, sheriff, or the like, but the term also
applies to a lawyer, who is obliged to obey court rules and who owes a duty of candor to the
court.” BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (9th ed. 2009).
149. See, e.g., Ferron v. Search Cactus, L.L.C., No. 2:06-CV-327, 2008 WL 1902499, at *4
(S.D. Ohio Apr. 28, 2008) (“[T]he two identified computer forensic experts shall serve as officers
of this court.”); Playboy Enters., Inc., 60 F. Supp. 2d at 1054 (“Any outside expert retained to
produce the ‘mirror image’ will sign a protective order and will be acting as an Officer of the
Court pursuant to this Order.”).
150. Achieving Quality, supra note 47, at 302.
